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This Special Issue of the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics presents papers
presented at the 4th CambridgeYMaastricht Symposium, held at Madingley Hall,
University of Cambridge, in June 2003. The papers covered a range of issues in real
estate ﬁnance and economics. In all eight papers were presented, with six being selected
for publication in this Special Issue of the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
Of these six papers, three were written by research teams based in Europe and three are
from the United States.
Andrey Paxlov and George Blazenko investigate the economics of real estate in-
vestment when maintenance of a property enhances neighborhood value. Dean Paxson
considers a real options model for property valuation and sequential investment timing.
David Feldman and Shulamith Gross apply a nonparametric data classiﬁcation technique
to classify the borrower and contractual features associated with mortgage default.
Chinmoy Ghosh and C. F. Sirmans examine the determinants of CEO compensation in
Real Estate Investment Trusts. Dirk Brounen and Piet Eichholtz investigate the effect of
corporate real estate ownership on share performance. Bob Edelstein Branko Urosevic
and Nicholas Wonder develop a model for explaining and testing large stakeholders’
ownership dynamics and the pricing of REITs shares.
The Neighborhood Effect of Real Estate Maintenance
The effect of maintenance on property values is a major concern for both private investors
and governments. Pavlov and Blanzenko examine the externality effect of real estate
investment when maintenance of a property enhances a neighborhood value. It is argued
that since the individual ignores the effect of one’s maintenance on other’s beneﬁt from it,
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# 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands.under-maintenance is resulted. Because the property owner cannot be certain that his/her
neighbor will commit the same effort at property maintenance as he/she, there will be
under-maintenance. The authors then examine various tax and subsidy structures target-
ed to generate the socially optimal maintenance level. It is shown that subsidizing the
maintenance expense of properties can induce socially optimal maintenance. Without
disturbing social optimality, the maintenance subsidy can be ﬁnanced with either a ﬂat
tax, which is less costly than the commonly used subsidies based on loan guarantees.
Multiple State Property Options
Paxson deals with a difﬁcult problem in property valuation and sequential investment
timing. The optimal investment strategy for a current or prospective property owner
should reﬂect the expected variability of future proﬁts, and current proﬁts relative to
threshold trigger proﬁts for a variety of alternative states and actions. Paxson considers a
real options model for property valuation which includes the option to invest, expand,
contract, suspend and abandon, as well as the options to switch back and forth between
these activity states. In terms of the real options model, the extension is with respect to
valuing ﬂexibility and what happens when investment options are reversible at a cost. The
numerical solutions show optimal proﬁt triggers and valuations for each of these real
options. It is found that (i) increasing the number of options generally reduces the
investment and abandonment triggers, and increases the investment option and total option
values (ii) increases in investment costs reduce the value of upward options, and increases
the optimal triggers for exercising those options, (iii) increases in expected proﬁt volatility
increase the value of all options, increases investment triggers and decreases abandonment
triggers.
Mortgage Default: Classiﬁcation and Regression Trees Analysis
Banks providing mortgage loans need to classify prospective borrowers, so as to dis-
tinguish the good from the bad risks. For this, a number of classiﬁcation systems are
available. David Feldman and Shulamith Gross are the ﬁrst to apply Classiﬁcation and
Regression Trees (CART) analysis to analyze mortgage data. In particular, they look at
mortgage default. Feldman and Gross ﬁrst provide an introduction of CART and a
comparison with other classiﬁcation methods such as discriminant analysis and neural
networks, with a focus on their application to real estate data. Subsequently, they apply the
technique to analyze a set of Israeli mortgage data and ﬁnd that borrowers’ characteristics
are generally more important than mortgage contract characteristics as predictors of
mortgage default. According to the authors, the CART technique can be used on a stand-
alone basis, but may be used in an even more efﬁcient way in combination with, or as input
for, other classiﬁcation methods.
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Corporate governance and the compensation of corporate ofﬁcers are among the hottest
current topics in ﬁnance. Chimney Ghosh and C. F. Sirmans investigate how board
characteristics inﬂuence the compensation of CEOs in the Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT) industry. Their main hypothesis is that board members, and especially outside
ones, will be driven by personal considerations and the beneﬁts from board membership
besides corporate performance measures when deciding on CEO compensation. Ghosh
and Sirmans use ordinary least squares regression and, to address potential endogeneity
problems, also two-stage least squares regression to investigate the explanatory power of
a number of board structure and corporate performance variables on CEO compensation.
The study is based on data for approximately 300 REITs and for the years 1998Y2000.
Their results are generally consistent with the existing empirical governance literature:
compensation is higher for large REITs, with large boards and relatively good accounting
performance, but lower for REITs with a high degree of CEO share ownership. CEO
chairmanship does not seem to have an effect on CEO pay.
Corporate Real Estate Ownership Implications
Dirk Brounen and Piet Eichholtz empirically examine how corporate real estate holdings
varies across industries and across countries, and also how these holdings affect the stock
performance of ﬁrms. In this study, the authors analyze a sample of 4,636 companies
from 18 industries and 9 countries. The relative real estate ownership is deﬁned as the
ratio of FProperty, Plant and Equipment_ (PPE) to total assets. The comparison of real
estate holdings reveals that real estate ownership is driven by industrial rather than
national differences. Overall, real estate ownership appears to be decreasing over time,
which may be due to the gaining popularity of lease alternatives. Companies in the
Business Services and Business Advisory sectors in particular have little need to own the
buildings in which they operate. An analysis of stock performance shows a signiﬁcantly
negative relationship between real estate ownership and a ﬁrm’s systematic risk. In each
industry Stock returns are found to be lowest among ﬁrms with the highest real estate
ownership levels. Idiosyncratic risk, however, does not seem to have signiﬁcant rela-
tionship with real estate ownership. The risk adjusted return patterns differ strongly
across industries, with a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between stock out perform-
ance and real estate ownership for Communications and Business Services.
Ownership Dynamics of REITs: A Theoretical and Empirical Schema
A large shareholder in a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) faces the trade-off between
sub-optimal diversiﬁcation on the one hand and the beneﬁts of control on the other.
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ownership of such a shareholder. Given the ownership developments in the REIT industry
during the last decade, this is a question with a high degree of practical relevance. The
authors show that a REIT insider who starts with a large ownership stake will gradually
liquidate his holdings until the marginal loss from risk bearing is exactly offset by the
private beneﬁts of control. Using a theoretical model, they show that larger marginal
beneﬁts of control for the large shareholder result in a higher ownership stake and an
increase in the share price of the REIT. The long-term allocation is found to be in-
dependent of the initial allocation.
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